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There is a view of the growth of knowledge that likens it to climbing a tree. We make
steady progress in our discoveries as we climb the trunk, but at some time we are forced to
make a decision. The branches begin to divide, so which will we take, which is most likely to
lead us onwards in the quest for truth? As we climb further, decision follows decision as the
main branch further divides and divides. Close to the top of the tree we survey the view and
feel we have made tremendous progress. But a haunting thought arises, what would have
been the view and what might we have discovered if we had taken a different route, a
different main branch and different sub-branches on our way up. Would we have learnt more,
and would the view from the top provide a more comprehensive panorama?
In the Handbook of Moral Motivation, the editors have collected together an array of
distinguished authors in the field of moral psychology and moral philosophy, all of whom
have an interest, one way or another, in the question what forces us to act morally, how are
we morally motivated? Teacher educators, not familiar with the history of moral psychology
and Lawrence Kohlberg’s work, might wonder why the notion of “moral motivation” is so
attractive to these climbers? Well, it was largely procedural. The issue of moral motivation,
as Don Collins Reed points out (page 341), relates to the so-called “judgment-action gap, the
gap between judging correctly the right thing to do and doing it” that arose within the
Kohlbergian tradition. Kohlberg and the later neo-Kohlbergians such as James Rest, needed a
way of bridging the dichotomy they observed between moral reasoning and moral action, and
the notion of “moral motivation” seemed to provide just such a bridge. The premise of this
handbook of moral motivation is that these distinguished authors have been climbing the
optimum branches of the tree, in pursuing his or her own disciplinary approach to morality
and its putative components. But have they?
The Introduction of the handbook, written by one of the editors Fritz Oser, tells the
reader that there are currently “12 different models of moral motivation” (pages 7-24). Most
have a strong link to Kohlberg’s theory of moral judgment and the subsequent work of James
Rest and his so-called Four Components Model of moral functioning, though some authors
adopt Augusto Blasi’s concept of the “moral self” as the basis of their moral motivation
models. One might expect an overall assessment of these different models, but Oser reveals
that this was not the handbook’s aim. Instead, his chapter attempts to “illustrate how all the
dimensions [of moral motivation theory] could be brought together” by providing a tentative
“global moral motivational model” (page 22). This kind of synthesising is not unusual in
psychology. However, those acquainted with the strictures of “Ockham's razor”, which
prohibits the multiplication of entities, may wonder why 12 models were necessary in the first
place? But, the existence of twelve models does at least indicate that the issue of “moral
motivation” has attracted many researchers in the field.
The contributions of philosophers Thomas Wren, Don Collins Reed, and Terence
Lovat and psychologists Gerhard Minnameier, and Augusto Blasi considerably strengthen the
handbook, because of the critical dimension they bring to their work. They are particularly
wary of “naïve psychological realism” (page 28) and the mechanistic reductionist tradition in
the field of moral psychology. Augusto Blasi, for example, whose notion of the “moral self”
is cited by many other contributors, laments: “the moral process, in fact, is fragmented into
many sub-functions, which then need to be coherently organised…. In other words, these
Vol 39, 1, January 2014

Australian Journal of Teacher Education
models are presented in such a way as if they were guided by a sort of mechanical rationality”
(page 231). In a similar vein, Gerhard Minnameier is critical of the reductive approach taken
by James Rest and neo-Kohlbergians. He claims that moral motivation in the form suggested
by James Rest is an unnecessary ad-hoc fragment. He argues that “what is thought to be
distinguished from moral judgment is proved to be indistinguishable from it” (page 74) and
“the whole idea of moral motivation seems utterly flawed” (page 72). Terence Lovat is
similarly critical of a reductive approach and stresses the irreducibility of one’s self, noting
that “self-knowing is central to motivation” (page 251), which he exemplifies by reference to
Thomas More and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. The criticisms of these scholars regarding the notion
of moral motivation are refreshing, but the readers need to be warned that a number of
contributions by other authors within the handbook are subject to the criticisms these scholars
raise. In other words, despite the synthetic aim of the handbook in papering over differences,
the cracks remain visible.
Don Collins Reed’s chapter accurately identifies two other deep-seated problems in
the study of moral motivation; the prevalent and seemingly irreconcilable dichotomy between
rationalism and emotivism, and between acts of deliberate conscious judgment and preconscious intuition. Reed notes that within the field of moral psychology, the importance of
emotion in moral reasoning and the role of intuition have been brought to focus by Jonathan
Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Model (SIM) and by the Dynamic Systems Approach (DSA) as
outlined by Kim and Sankey in 2009. Reed’s observations have particular relevance for
teacher educators, because, as I have noted elsewhere (Kim, 2013), the two dichotomies he
identifies have been pervasive in the pedagogy adopted for “teacher training courses that aim
to enhance students’ moral and ethical awareness and behaviour” (p. 13). Reed’s main thesis
is that these dichotomies can be overcome if we recognise that “what look like rival and
incompatible accounts are accounts of different levels of person functioning” (page 359) and
all of these levels are “essential for moral motivation for human flourishing” (page 353). He
also believes that the Dynamic Systems Approach could offer a non-reductionist account of
moral motivation encompassing different levels of description. Personally, I have my doubts
that Reed’s synthetic aims can be realised, not least because in emphasising the role of
emotion and intuition in morality, Haidt sets them against moral rationality. Indeed, from a
dynamic systems point of view, the cognitive developmental models of Kohlberg and Rest
and Haidt’s social intuitionism are each founded on a flawed dichotomy between reason and
emotion.
The many readers of the Australian Journal of Teacher Education will find parts 6
and 7 of the handbook particularly interesting. The contributors in these sections bring
extensive outcomes from research conducted in the context of professional education,
including teacher, dentistry, business, and military education. Many of these studies were
premised on one of the models of moral motivation introduced in the previous parts of the
handbook. Sharon Nodie Oja and Patricia Craig, and Elizabeth Campbell identify “collegial
loyalty” (page 530) and “pressures to conform” (page 590) as one of the biggest hindrances to
one’s motivation to pursue the right course of action within the practice of education. Oja and
Craig illustrate how novice interns perceive and cope with this pressure. They conclude that
elements of “reflective coaching”, “support and challenge” and “guided inquiry” can form a
well-structured internship environment where entering professionals are encouraged to pursue
ethical commitment (page 601). As the book title intimates, these sections of the handbook
are intended to demonstrate the application of theories and models to professional
development and the practice of education. Some readers of AJTE may be unsettled by this
‘theory into practice’ approach, as it seems to separate theory and practice, when in reality
theory in education normally has practice in view and practice is inevitably impregnated with
theories of one kind or another, even if they remain implicit. Nevertheless, there is much in
these chapters that has relevance to teacher education as a spur to reflection, and will reward
careful study.
Overall, this handbook will be of considerable interest to those specialising in moral
development and moral functioning theory, particularly in the Asia Pacific nations where the
Kohlbergian approach remains strong in the context of education. But it also has wider
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appeal, if only because it allows readers to see where many established scholars in the field of
moral theory are currently focusing their research energies. But the thought returns, is the
exploration of morality presented in the handbook situated primarily in just one part of the
tree of moral theory, and is the focus on moral motivation a result of climbing up one main
branch and its tributaries, ignoring other possible branches where the notion of moral
motivation is unnecessary or irrelevant? And has the chosen route taken by these authors
afforded the best possible vista, even though over the past half-century, or more, so much
time and energy has gone into studying every available twig and leaf?
As noted above, Reed’s chapter intimates at least two alternative approaches, the
Social Intuitionist Model and the Dynamic Systems Approach, but these do not need a theory
of moral motivation to bridge a perceived dichotomy between moral reasoning and moral
action, because they do not see a dichotomy needing to be bridged. Haidt, as already noted,
does away with moral reasoning, calling it a ‘delusion’ (Haidt, 2012, p.28); rationality, he
claims, is always intuitive. The Dynamics Systems Approach accepts moral reasoning and
moral intuition, emphasising the dynamic and multi-causal nature of morality, where thought
and action are interwoven holistically one with another such that they cannot easily be
separated. These alternatives provide two very different main branches up the tree, and the
problem is that it is not easy for those who have gone up the cognitive developmental
approach to step sideways to joint those on the other routes up. They would need to come
down the tree a good way before finding a safe footing to adjoining branches, and doing so
would require abandoning the notion of moral motivation. So, to conclude, perhaps the main
contribution of the handbook is to provide a rich and deeply interesting account of one
theoretical approach to morality, but one senses it is more like reading a compendium of past
explorations rather than a climbers guide for the future.
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